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It goes without saying that a country’s current
account deficits must be financed. In the case of a
country with its own currency, this means that it needs
foreign exchange to pay for the deficit. Its possibilities
for paying for a deficit are accordingly limited by its
foreign exchange reserves and the willingness of for-
eign private or public persons or organisations to
grant private or public credit. 
The same holds with some differences for a member
state of the European Monetary Union (EMU),
since the central bank of the country that is a mem-
ber of the EMU does not need foreign exchange
reserves for payments within the euro area, as these
are transferred via the European Central Bank by
means of the so-called Target clearing system. If, for
example, a Greek buyer of German goods wants to
pay for them, his account at a Greek bank will be
debited, which in turn has the same amount debited
at the Greek central bank that transfers it to the
ECB. At the ECB, a corresponding amount is debit-
ed to the Greek central bank and credited to the
Deutsche Bundesbank (Buba) that subsequently
credits the account of the seller’s bank. The seller
finally receives the amount in question in his
account at this bank. 
Regarding the financing of a current account deficit
in the amount D of a member state of the currency
union, apart from negligible presents, the following
financing condition holds:
(1) D = DKpr + DKpu + DKprf + DKpuf,
where DKpr and DKpu are private and public credits
granted by other countries of the monetary union;
correspondingly, DKprf und DKpuf are private and
public credits granted by foreign countries outside the
currency union. For the country itself K represents an
increase in its liabilities (debts). 
As the country’s deficit vis-à-vis non-EMU countries,
Df, is being financed by these via lending, the follow-
ing equation results using equation (1)
(2) Df = DKprf + DKpuf = D – DKpr – DKpu,
where the country’s deficit vis-à-vis the other states of
the EMU, named Dew, is
(3) Dew = D – Df.
Let us assume now (assumption 1) that there is no
deficit of the country under consideration with coun-
tries outside the EMU, e.g. because its insolvency is
feared and therefore neither private nor public lenders
are willing to grant new loans, i.e. to export more cap-
ital to this country. Then
(4) DKprf + DKpuf = 0 
and it follows from equations (2) and (3)
(5) D = Dew = DKpr + DKpu
This means that, because of assumption 1, the current
account deficit only exists vis-à-vis the EMU coun-
tries and is being financed by them. We now divide
public lending DKpu into that of the governments and
the European Commission, DKg, and that of the cen-
tral banks, DKcb, of the remaining EMU countries,
so that
(6) DKpu = DKg + DKcb.
It must be noticed that DKcb shows up as a liability
of the country in question on the balance sheet of
the ECB, and that the latter then credits the central
banks of the other member states with the same
amount.  * University of Basel.Thus we obtain
(7) DVcb = DKcb,
where DVcb denotes the increase in the liabilities of
the country vis-à-vis the ECB. 
Let us now use assumption 2, that private entities inside
the EMU for similar reasons as those outside are no
longer prepared to grant the country any further cred-
it; and further make assumption 3, that governments
and the commission have not granted any loans during
the period in question, then, because DKpr = 0 and
DKg = 0 it follows from equations (5) and (6)
(8) D = Dew = DKcb.
This result follows from the tautology and assump-
tions 1 to 3. Whether it corresponds to the facts is an
empirical question that depends on the countries con-
sidered, the period chosen and the correctness of the
assumptions. 
Let us now test this for the period from 2007 to 2010
for the hypothesis that the deficit country refers to all
GIPS, i.e. to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain,
whereas Germany and therefore its central bank is the
only creditor. Then the assumptions, especially equa-
tion (7) can at most be approximately correct. To the
extent to which the approximation is close enough, we
may consider the hypothesis that mainly the
Bundesbank has financed the deficits of the GIPS as
by and large confirmed. 
Therefore equations (8) and (7) should be confirmed
according to their magnitudes, since only then are the
three assumptions roughly fulfilled. This means that
firstly the combined deficit D of the GIPS should cor-
respond to the change in their Target debt at the ECB,
DVzb, and secondly that this should roughly corre-
spond to the change in the Target credit of the Buba,
DKcb, at the ECB. 
The results for the period from 2007 to 2010 are: 
Dew = 365 billion euros;
DVcb = 340 billion euros and
DKcb = 326 billion euros.
The highest and the lowest of these figures differ by
not more than 7.4 percent or 4.1 percent respectively
from 340 billion euros. Considering our drastic
assumptions 1 to 3, these differences do not suffice to
refute the hypothesis that the accumulated deficit of
the GIPS countries from 2007 to 2010 was essentially
financed by the increase of their Target debt at the
ECB, which in turn was financed by the creation of a
corresponding Target credit of the Bundesbank. 
In view of the derived results it is reasonable to ask
how long this kind of financing the deficits of the
GIPS countries may be continued. In the past, this
was possible without damage to the system, as the
ECB expanded its monetary base so much after 2007
that it was possible to raise the Target debts all the
more without a strong expansion of the monetary
base, i.e. the central bank money supply issued by the
ECB. The existing scope, however, will be exhausted
in the foreseeable future, probably in two years, if the
monetary base does not grow further. This would fur-
ther increase the risk of inflation, however. And it
would do so in a situation in which inflation will
threaten anyway if the ECB does not succeed in a
timely reduction of the excessive central bank money
supply and raise its interest rates. This risk posed by
Target financing should not surprise anybody, as the
increase in the Target debt of the GIPS countries is
nothing else than the financing of deficits by moneti-
sation. It therefore comes as no surprise that the 
ECB is arguing so energetically in favour of an expan-
sion of the rescue funds for these countries and thus
for the assumption of their debts by the member
states of the euro area, the EU Commission and the
International Monetary Fund. 
But there may be another possibility for a time for the
GIPS countries and thus the ECB instead of expand-
ing the monetary base. Instead of increasing their
Target debts at the ECB, these countries would have
to finance their deficits by relinquishing their gold
reserves to the ECB and thus indirectly to the
Bundesbank. This would, of course, only be possible
until their gold stocks were exhausted. 
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